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Abstract—Joint privacy-cost optimization is studied for a smart
grid consumer, whose electricity consumption is monitored in
almost real time by the utility provider (UP). It is assumed
that an energy storage device, e.g., an electrical battery, is
available to the consumer, which can be utilized both to achieve
privacy and to reduce the energy cost by modifying the electricity
consumption. Privacy is measured via the mean squared distance
between the smart meter readings and a target load profile,
while time-of-use pricing is considered to compute the electricity
cost. The consumer also has the possibility to sell electricity
back to the UP to further improve the privacy-cost trade-
off. Two privacy-preserving energy management policies (EMPs)
are proposed, which differ in the way the target load profile
is characterized. Additionally, a simplified and more practical
EMP, which optimizes the energy management less frequently,
is considered. Numerical results are presented to compare the
performances of these EMPs in terms of the privacy-cost trade-
off they achieve, considering a number of privacy indicators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart meters (SMs) are pivotal components of the smart
grid, enabling two-way communication between each house-
hold and the utility provider (UP), i.e., the entity that sells
energy to consumers. These benefits include the generation
of more accurate electricity bills, faster detection of energy
theft and outages, application of time-of-use (ToU) tariffs to
match demand and available resources, easier integration of
microgeneration systems, e.g., photovoltaic panels and micro
wind farms, and residential energy storage solutions, and the
possibility for the consumers to sell energy to the grid. For
these reasons, the SM roll-out is proceeding rapidly and is
attracting massive investments worldwide [1]. However, the
SM’s ability to monitor a user’s electricity consumption in
almost real-time entails serious implications about consumer
privacy. In fact, non-intrusive appliance load monitoring tech-
niques are able to distinguish the power signatures of specific
appliances from the aggregated household SM measurements,
revealing sensitive information about a consumer’s life, such
as her presence at home, religious beliefs, disabilities, ill-
nesses [2], [3]. SM privacy is particularly critical for certain
businesses, e.g., factories and data centers, as their power
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consumption profile may reveal information about the state
of their businesses.
A. Privacy-Aware SM Techniques
Privacy-preserving methods for SMs can be classified into
two families. The first family, called the smart meter data
manipulation (SMDM) family [4], encompasses methods that
modify SM measurements before reporting them to the UP,
and includes data obfuscation [5], aggregation [6], anonymiza-
tion [7], and down-sampling [8] approaches. However, as
described in [4] these techniques suffer from several short-
comings. First, obfuscation approaches add noise to the SM
readings, causing a mismatch between the reported values and
the real energy consumption, which prevents DSOs and UPs
from accurately monitoring the grid state. Second, anonymiza-
tion and aggregation techniques that include the presence of
a trusted third party (TTP) only shift the problem of trust
from one entity (UP) to another (TTP). Third, DSOs, UPs,
or more generally any eavesdropper can embed additional
sensors right outside a household or a business to monitor the
energy consumption, without fully relying on SM readings.
The second family of privacy-preserving approaches, called
the user demand shaping (UDS) family [4], overcome these
issues by considering methods that modify the consumer’s
actual electricity consumption, called the user load, rather
than modifying the data sent to the UP. This is achieved
by exploiting physical resources, e.g., rechargeable batteries
(RBs), or renewable energy sources (RESs), that make the
user load as different as possible from the SM measurements,
called the grid load [9]–[11].
In this paper we adopt UDS techniques because they
report the energy taken from the grid accurately, without
any modification, employing physical resources such as RBs
and RESs, which are becoming increasingly available to the
consumers. Our aim is to jointly minimize the information
leaked about a user and the cost of electricity. While a widely
accepted definition of privacy is elusive, one would expect
that privacy is achieved when it is not possible to distinguish
a specific appliance load from the aggregated household
energy consumption [9]. Statistical privacy measures have
been studied in [10]–[15], measuring the leaked information
by the mutual information between the user and the grid
loads; however, this requires the knowledge of the underlying
statistics, and the results are typically valid under various
simplifications, such as assuming independent and identically
distributed user load profiles, and over sufficiently long time
horizons. An alternative approach is based on the idea that
a high degree of privacy can be achieved by flattening the
2power consumption around a target load profile, e.g., the
distance from a completely private profile, as considered in
[10] and [16]–[18], where joint privacy-cost optimization is
also studied. In [10], [16] and [17] the target load profile
is set to be a constant value across time, typically equal to
the average consumption. In this model, it is assumed that
the energy management unit (EMU), i.e., the system that
implements the privacy-preserving energy management policy
(EMP) at the user’s premises, knows, or, accurately predicts,
the load profile for the time period of interest, and obtains
the optimal EMP by solving an optimization problem. On the
other hand, a completely constant consumption may not be
practically viable or desirable, since the energy cost may vary
greatly during the system operation due to ToU tariffs. Hence,
in [18] the EMU is allowed to target a different fixed power
value for each price period. The flexibility of this approach
leads to a better overall privacy-cost trade-off; however, such
a piecewise constant target profile implies also an inherent
information leakage compared to a constant target profile. We
follow up on [10] and [16]–[18], and measure the privacy
leakage as the squared distance between grid and target load
profiles; however, differently from those works, we consider a
more general target load profile, and assume that the consumer
has only a partial knowledge of her future energy consumption
and energy cost. We note that one could also measure the
privacy leakage as the distance between the grid and the user
loads. However, if we assume that the aim is to increase the
distance between the grid and the user loads, this might lead to
a potentially deterministic strategy for the EMU, e.g., produce
a low grid load when the user load is high and vice-versa.
Since we also assume that the UP knows the optimal strategy
implemented by the EMU, such a strategy would finally result
in a better estimate of the user load by the UP. On the contrary,
trying to match the grid load with a specific target load would
make the user load harder to estimate by the UP; for example,
flattening the grid load independent of the user load reveals
only the average energy consumption.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) While full information on the future electricity consump-
tion is assumed to be available at the EMU in [10] and
[18], which we call the long horizon model (LHM),
here we consider a more realistic scenario whereby the
consumer’s future consumption profile is only partially
known to the EMU, in a moving or receding horizon
manner, which we call the short horizon model (SHM).
The optimal solution at any time is computed only based
on the currently available information within the predic-
tion horizon by adopting a model predictive controller,
recently implemented in a SM setting in [12]. We present
a detailed comparison of the results for SHM and LHM.
2) We introduce a target load profile computed as a low-
pass filtered version of the user load, since higher-
frequency components of a user’s consumption profile
leak more information about her behaviour, compared
to lower-frequency components. To the authors’ knowl-
edge, this is the first time that such a target profile has
been studied in the SM privacy-preservation literature.
Fig. 1: The system model. Ut, Gt and Ut − Gt are the user
load, the grid load, and the energy exchanged drawn from the
battery at time t, respectively. The dashed line represents the
meter readings being accurately reported to the UP.
3) We propose a more practical EMP which performs the
optimization less frequently. The optimal solution is
computed in batch, reducing the algorithm’s computa-
tional load at the expense of the privacy-cost trade-off.
Finally, we compare the privacy-cost trade-offs for all
the scenarios considered.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we present the system model, while in Sections
III and IV we consider the SHM for a constant and a filtered
target load profile, respectively. A more practical EMP with
less regular policy updates is analyzed in Section V, while
conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
B. Notation
Random variables are denoted by capital letters, e.g., U,G,
their realizations by lower-case letters, e.g., u, g, and the corre-
sponding alphabets by calligraphic letters, e.g., U ,G. For inte-
gers 0 < a < b, U ba denotes the sequence [Ua, Ua+1, . . . , Ub],
while U b , U b1 . The positive part [x]
+ is equal to x if x > 0,
and 0 otherwise. When solving optimization problems, we
denote the optimal value of a variable with a star, e.g., G∗
denotes the optimal value of the parameter G.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the discrete time system depicted in Fig. 1,
in which each t represents one time slot (TS) of duration d
seconds, for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , where N is the time horizon of
interest. For TS t, the user load, i.e., the total power requested
by all the household appliances within TS t, is denoted by
Ut ∈ U , while the grid load is Gt ∈ G. We remark that
the TSs in our model correspond to time instants when the
electricity is actually requested by the user and drawn from the
grid, rather than the typically longer sampling interval used for
sending SM measurements to the UP. We assume that the SM
measures and records the output power values at each TS; this
is because our aim is to protect consumers’ privacy not only
from the UP, but also from the DSO or any other attacker that
may deploy a sensor on the consumer’s power line recording
3the electricity consumption in almost real-time. We assume the
presence of an RB at the user’s premises, of capacity Bmax,
which is used both to filter the user load in order to provide
privacy, and to shift energy intake from the grid to minimize
the cost. The EMU computes the amount of energy to draw
from the grid, Gt, and to exchange with the RB, Ut − Gt.
Let Bt ∈ [0, Bmax] denote the amount of energy in the RB at
the end of TS t, and we set B0 = 0. The RB is charging if
Gt − Ut ≥ 0, and discharging otherwise. We assume that the
user’s electricity consumption and electricity price are known
for a horizon of HF TSs beyond the current TS, naming HF
as the prediction horizon. Additionally, we assume that the
EMU has memory about the past HP TSs, which we call the
past horizon. At each TS t, the EMU computes an EMP for
the following HF TSs, using its knowledge of the user load
within the prediction horizon, and the user and grid loads, and
the RB level of energy within the past horizon.
A. System Constraints
Let t+HF , min{t+HF , N}. We do not allow wasting
grid energy; that is, there are no battery overflows, i.e.,
Bt−1 +
t+HF∑
τ=t
(Gτ − Uτ )d ≤ Bmax, ∀t. (1)
While additional energy can be stored in the RB for future
use, we do not allow demand rescheduling, so that user’s
energy demands are always satisfied at the time of request,
i.e., we impose: Gtd ≥ Utd − Bt−1, ∀t. This leads to the
following constraint:
t+HF∑
τ=t
(Uτ −Gτ )d ≤ Bt−1, ∀t, (2)
which is also implicitly verified by the equation expressing
the evolution of the energy level in the battery:
0 ≤ Bt+1 = Bt +Gt+1d− Ut+1d. (3)
The power the RB can be charged or discharged at is
constrained by Pˆc and Pˆd, respectively. Thus, ∀t we have:
Gt − Ut ≤ Pˆc, (4)
Ut −Gt ≤ Pˆd. (5)
The model could be made more accurate by introducing
further constraints, e.g., battery charging and discharging ef-
ficiency parameters, which we leave for future research that
will focus on the practical implications of the proposed UDS
techniques.
We study and compare the two scenarios in which energy
can or cannot be sold to the UP. The price of energy sold to
the grid is set equal to the price of energy bought from it,
i.e., the net metering approach, in which the SM can measure
bi-directional energy flows [19]. If energy cannot be sold, then
Gt ≥ 0, ∀t, (6)
whereas, if energy can be sold, we have:
Gt :
{
≥ 0, if energy is purchased from the UP,
< 0, if energy is sold to the UP.
(7)
Given (Ut, Bt) = (ut, bt), Bmax and the constraints (4)-(6),
the set of feasible energy requests at time t is given by
G¯t(ut, bt) ,
{
gt ∈ G :
[
ut −min
{bt
d
, Pˆd
}]+
≤ gt
≤ ut +min
{
Pˆc,
Bmax − bt
d
}}
. (8)
If selling energy to the UP is allowed, then the feasible set
is as in (8), without the [·]+ operator.
We design an EMP that decides on the grid load at each
TS t while satisfying the above constraints. We consider a
model predictive control approach, whereby the user load
and the cost of energy are known beforehand within the
prediction horizon [t + 1, . . . , t + HF ], and our goal is to
jointly minimize the information leaked about a user’s energy
consumption as well as the cost the user incurs to purchase
energy from the UP. While non-causal knowledge of the
electricity price for the typical range of interest is a realistic
assumption in today’s energy networks, non-causal knowledge
of power consumption is appropriate for appliances whose
activity can be accurately predicted, e.g., refrigerators, boilers,
heaters and electric vehicles. We note that the setting studied
in [18], which assumes all future energy consumption and cost
information to be known beforehand, is a lower bound on the
setting studied in this paper, as more information leads to a
better privacy-cost trade-off.
Let the target load at time t be denoted by Wt. We measure
the privacy leakage as the average variance of the grid load
GN from the target load profile WN :
P ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
(Gt −Wt)
2, (9)
according to which, perfect privacy is achieved when Gt =
Wt, ∀t. We adopt squared distance in (9) so that we do not
differentiate between negative and positive deviations of the
grid load with respect to the target load. The average cost
incurred by the user is given by
C ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
CtGt, (10)
where Ct is the cost of power at time t, which is determined
by the specific ToU tariff employed by the UP.
B. Simulation Settings
For numerical simulations, we use real SM consumption
traces from the UK Dale dataset [20], which has a time
resolution of 6 seconds. We convert the original readings to
a time resolution of 10 minutes to reduce the computational
complexity. As RB, we consider the Tesla Powerwall 21, for
which Bmax = 13.5kWh, and Pˆc = Pˆd = 5kW. We consider
a ToU tariff currently being offered in the UK2, in which
the off-peak price is 4.99p/kWh during 23:00 to 6:00, the
medium price is 11.99p/kWh during 6:00 to 16:00 and during
19:00 to 23:00, and the peak price is 24.99p/kWh during
16:00 to 19:00. All the simulation results are obtained for
a time interval spanning 14 consecutive days, to average over
a considerably large amount of data. Due to space limitations,
4we will mostly present numerical results when selling energy
to the grid is not allowed, unless energy selling leads to
significantly different results.
III. TARGET LOAD AS A CONSTANT VALUE
In this section, following up on [9], [17] and [10], we
assume that the goal of the EMU is to keep the grid load as
constant as possible. In [11] it is assumed that all the future
user load and energy cost values are known, and the EMU
can fix a target value for the whole duration, e.g., one whole
day. In our model the information available to the EMU on Ut
and Ct is limited to the prediction horizon, and changes over
time; thus, the target load cannot be constant, and its variability
depends on the length of the past and prediction horizons. In
this section, given the knowledge of the cost of energy and
the user’s power consumption, the aim is to characterize both
the optimal target load W ∗ and the optimal grid load G∗ so
as to optimize the overall privacy-cost trade-off.
Given the nature of the objective functions and the con-
straints, pairs of (P , C) form a convex region and the optimal
points can be characterized by the Pareto boundary of this
region. Hence, the objective can be cast as a weighted sum of
privacy leakage (9) and cost (10):
min
G
t+HF
t
,Wt
α
t+HF∑
τ=t−HP
(Gτ −Wt)
2 + (1−α)
t+HF∑
τ=t
GτCτ , (11)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the weighting parameter, i.e., if α = 0
only cost of energy is minimized, whereas if α = 1 only infor-
mation leakage is minimized; and t−HP , max{t−HP , 0}.
We remark that setting the value of α is up to the consumer,
who is in charge of deciding whether to focus more on
protecting her privacy or on saving costs. The result of the
minimization in (11) is the grid load for the current TS and
the entire duration of the prediction horizon Gt+HFt , and the
target load Wt. Eq. (11) characterizes the target load value
Wt for the finite prediction horizon, which leads to the optimal
privacy-cost trade-off over this horizon, based on the available
information. At TS t + 1, the minimization (11) is carried
out again based on the additional information that becomes
available, i.e., Gt+HF+1 and Ct+HF+1, and Gt+1 and Wt+1
are determined. The past horizon
∑t−1
τ=t−HP
(Gτ − Wt)
2 is
considered when optimizing for the privacy objective, since it
ensures smoother variations of the overall target load profile.
We note that, since privacy and cost in (11) may have signifi-
cantly different magnitudes, they need to be further normalized
1https://www.tesla.com/powerwall
2https://www.greenenergyuk.com/Tide
(a) SHM, no energy selling. (b) LHM, no energy selling.
(c) SHM, energy selling. (d) LHM, energy selling.
Fig. 2: Power profiles for α = 0.5 and HF = HP = 2h. In the
figures, the arrows of green, orange and red colors denote time
intervals characterized by off-peak, medium and peak price for
the electricity cost, respectively.
to get the Pareto optimal solution consistent with α. Hence,
we implement the normalization approach described in [21].
Remark 1. Differently from [18], here we do not impose the
RB to be emptied at the end of each time window [t−HP , t+
HF ], since here the end of the prediction horizon does not
typically coincide with the end of the time horizon of interest,
and the energy remaining in the RB can be utilized in the
following TSs. Since the algorithm jointly minimizes privacy
leakage and cost, the RB is normally emptied at the end of the
time horizon of interest N , unless α is high. If α→ 1 and the
RB is large, a sustained demand of energy may take place in
the short term, which is ultimately constrained by Bmax and
Pˆc.
Fig. 2 compares the load profiles of the SHM and LHM over
the course of one day. As one would expect, the LHM provides
much better performance, in the sense that the resultant profile
is much more flat, hiding most of the spikes in consumption,
which typically reveal more information about user’s behavior.
However, the SHM, despite relying on much less data, also
leads to a reasonable suppression of the peaks in the profile.
One can also argue that the SHM reveals more information
about the low-frequency variation of user’s energy consump-
L(Gt+HFt ,Wt,λ) = α
t+HF∑
τ=t−HP
(Gτ −Wt)
2 + (1− α)
t+HF∑
τ=t
GτCτ +
t+HF∑
τ=t
λ(1)τ
[
d
τ∑
s=t
(Gs − Us)−Bmax +Bt−1
]
+
t+HF∑
τ=t
λ(2)τ
[
d
τ∑
s=t
(Us −Gs)−Bt−1
]
+
t+HF∑
τ=t
λ(3)τ (Gτ − Uτ − Pˆc) +
t+HF∑
τ=t
λ(4)τ (Uτ −Gτ − Pˆd). (12)
5tion, which, however, is common across households, and
thus provides only a limited amount of personal information.
Moreover, Figs. 2a and 2c show that the peaks of the grid load
generated by the SHM are not necessarily aligned with those
of the user load.
A. Solution to the Optimization Problem (11)
In the following we consider the optimization problem (11)
for α 6= {0, 1}. We analyze first the optimal solution when
selling of energy is allowed, i.e., (6) does not hold. Based
on (11) and the constraints (1)-(2) and (4)-(5), we define the
Lagrangian function in (12), where λ
(j)
τ ≥ 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4,
are the Lagrange multipliers, and t ≤ τ ≤ t+HF . Denoting
the vectors in bold, we have λ = [λ(1),λ(2),λ(3),,λ(4)]. The
slackness conditions are imposed on the inequality constraints,
for τ = t, t+ 1, . . . , t+HF :
λ(1)τ
[
d
τ∑
s=t
(Gs − us)−Bmax +Bt−1
]
= 0, (13)
λ(2)τ
[
d
τ∑
s=t
(Us −Gs)−Bt−1
]
= 0, (14)
λ(3)τ (Gτ − Uτ − Pˆc) = 0, (15)
λ(4)τ (Uτ −Gτ − Pˆd) = 0. (16)
Let aτ , d
∑t+HF
s=τ (λ
(2)
s − λ
(1)
s ) − λ
(3)
τ + λ
(4)
τ , and
C˜τ ,
(1−α)
2α Cτ . Applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions and setting the gradient of the Lagrangian to zero,
we obtain the following expressions:
G∗τ =
aτ
2α
− C˜τ +W
∗
t , for τ = t, . . . , t+HF , (17)
W ∗t =
∑t+HF
τ=t−HP
G∗τ
1 + min{HP , t}+min{HF , N − t}
. (18)
The optimal solution for the grid load given in (17) re-
sembles the classical water-filling algorithm [22]. However,
differently from the classical water-filling formulation, here
the water level, G∗τ + C˜t =
aτ
2α + W
∗
t , is not constant, but
varies over time due to the instantaneous power constraints.
The optimal solutions in (17) and (18) depend on the values of
the Lagrangian multipliers and can be determined numerically.
When α = 0, the only objective is to minimize the cost, and
(11) reduces to a linear program (LP,) which can be solved
using standard LP solvers. On the other hand, when the user
is not concerned about the cost, i.e., α = 1, (11) leads to a
quadratic program analogous to the general case.
When energy selling is not allowed, the constraint (6)
holds, and the Lagrangian in (12) is modified accordingly.
The slackness conditions are given in Eqs. (13)–(16), as well
as, for τ = t, . . . , t+HF : λ
(5)
τ Gτ = 0, and λ
(6)Wt = 0.
Let a˜τ , d
∑t+HF
s=τ (λ
(2)
s − λ
(1)
s ) − λ
(3)
τ + λ
(4)
τ + λ
(5)
τ . Then,
we obtain the following expressions, counterparts of (17) and
(18):
G∗τ =
[
a˜τ
2α
− C˜τ +W
∗
t
]+
, for τ = t, . . . , t+HF , (19)
(a) α = 0. (b) α = 1.
Fig. 3: Optimal grid and target load profiles, for Bmax = 4,
Pˆc = Pˆd = 2, when energy selling is not allowed.
W ∗t =
[ ∑t+HF
τ=t−HP
G∗τ + λ
(6)
1 + min{HP , t}+min{HF , N − t}
]+
. (20)
B. Illustration of the Water-filling Solution
Here we present the solution for some simple scenarios to
acquire an intuition on the solution of the optimization prob-
lem (11), and on its water-filling interpretation. We assume that
energy selling is not allowed, N = 6, and d = 1, so that power
and energy can be used interchangeably. Let the user load and
cost vectors be U6 = [1, 2, 6, 5, 2, 4] and C6 = [1, 2, 5, 3, 1, 3],
respectively, and HP = HF = 2 TSs. Consider an RB with
Bmax = 4 and Pˆc = Pˆd = 2. Fig. 3a shows the optimal
solution for α = 0,G∗,6 = [3, 4, 4, 3, 4, 2]. Since the electricity
is cheaper in the first and second TSs, more energy is requested
from the grid during these TSs and stored in the RB to partially
satisfy the demand at later TSs. However, the energy that can
be requested in advance, and stored in the battery, is limited
by both Bmax and Pˆc. In the first TS Pˆc limits the grid load,
since G∗1 = U1 + Pˆc = 3, and the level of energy in the RB
at the end of the first TS is B1 = Pˆc = 2. In the second TS,
the grid load is limited by Pˆc and Bmax simultaneously, and
G∗2 = U2 + Pˆc = 4, and B2 = Bmax = 4. Note that, although
the third TS is the most expensive, G∗3 = 4 because the battery
cannot be discharged by more than 2 units of energy (Pˆd = 2).
For the same reason, G∗4 = 3, while the remaining energy was
stored in the second TS. Similar considerations hold for the
last two TSs. Fig. 3b illustrates the optimal solution for α = 1,
G∗,6 = [3, 3.5, 4, 3.75, 3.88, 3.81]. In this scenario, the EMP
tries to match Gt to the target load Wt, even at the cost of
asking more energy than needed. The energy demand in the
first TS is the same as the case α = 0, whereas in the second
TS less energy is stored in the battery to be used in the fourth
TS, so that the water level matches the target load in this TS (at
the expense of a higher cost in the fourth TS). It is noteworthy
that more energy than needed is requested in the fourth TS,
and used to satisfy the demand during the fifth TS, which is
cheaper. Finally, more energy than needed is requested in the
last two TSs and depicted in yellow, which is consequently
stored in the RB to be used in future TSs. This allows the
privacy-preserving algorithm to match the target and the grid
load during these TSs.
Fig. 4 shows the same scenario with Bmax = 20, Pˆc =
Pˆd = 10, and when energy can be sold. When α = 0, Fig. 4a
6(a) α = 0. (b) α = 1.
Fig. 4: Optimal grid and target load profiles, for Bmax = 20,
Pˆc = Pˆd = 10, when energy selling is allowed.
shows that energy is bought when it is cheaper and sold back
to the grid when it is more expensive, while C˜3 and C˜4 are
plotted as negative since energy is sold in these TSs. In fact,
the RB is emptied of the energy stored during the first two
TSs at the end of the fourth TS, and it is emptied again of the
energy stored during the fifth TS at the end of the sixth TS.
This is done to maximize the user’s profit from selling energy
to the grid when it is more expensive. When α = 1, Fig.
4b shows that a larger RB permits greater flexibility but also
boosts the amount of energy requested. This is not necessarily
a disadvantage, as such energy can be used at a later TS.
C. Impact of the Duration of Prediction and Past Horizons
Fig. 5 shows the load profiles for various combinations
of prediction and past horizons HF and HP , respectively.
As expected, a larger HF produces “flatter” target and grid
loads (see Fig. 5c), compared to a smaller HF (see Fig.
5a). However, when HF is larger the resulting grid load is
more distant from the target load, thus resulting in a higher
information leakage according to our definition of privacy
leakage in Eq. (9). In fact, when HF is small, the grid load
values that are compared to the target load are few, and the
EMP is able to determine a target load that is close to the grid
load within the analyzed time window. On the other hand,
when HF is large, the EMP needs to find a single target load
that matches a longer interval of predicted grid load values;
as a result, the target load may be less representative for some
periods. A longer past horizon leads to a flatter target load
(see Fig. 5b), however, the improvement for the grid load is
not as evident as in the case of a longer prediction horizon.
Fig. 6 shows the average information leakage P , average
cost C, and average target load variance with respect to HF .
The average target load variance, which can be considered as
another privacy indicator, is defined as
V ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
(Wt − µW )
2, (21)
where µW is the mean ofW across time. When α is small, i.e.,
the main focus is to minimize the cost, a largerHF reduces the
average cost up to a certain extent, beyond which it cannot be
further reduced (see Fig. 6b); whereas for α = 1 the cost does
not change considerably with HF . Opposite considerations
hold for the information leakage, which even slightly increases
when α 6= 1 (see Fig. 6a ). This is due to the fact that a longer
prediction horizon generates a grid load that is more distant
from the target load, except for α = 1, when the focus is
on privacy only. Fig. 6c shows that increasing HF induces a
smaller variance of the target load.
Fig. 7, which shows P , C and V with respect to HP ,
exhibits similar behaviors to those in Fig. 6, with some
notable differences. The y-axis ranges are more limited here,
confirming that the knowledge of past consumption is less
critical for the EMP compared to the knowledge of future
consumption and costs. This explains the far smaller reduction
in cost in Fig. 7b, as compared to Fig. 6b, and the increase in
the information leakage when α = 1 in Fig. 7a. Fig. 7c shows
that the target variance is higher and more variable when
α = 1; however, this corresponds to the case in which the grid
load is closer to the target load, i.e., the most private scenario
according to our original privacy measure. This contradiction
of the two privacy indicators shows that evaluating the variance
of the target load does not fully reflect the level of privacy
achieved, as defined in (9).
D. Alternative Privacy Measures
As opposed to the LHM studied in [10], where Wt is fixed
throughout the operation time, in the model considered in this
paper Wt is allowed to vary over time. Therefore, the squared
distance between Gt andWt may not be sufficient as a privacy
measure on its own. Accordingly, we consider alternative
measures of privacy to see the impact of the proposed model
predictive control framework on those measures. One of the
objectives of privacy-preserving algorithms for SM data is to
mask the difference between successive power measurements,
called features, which non-intrusive appliance load monitoring
algorithms exploit to identify appliances’ switch-on/off events
[23]. Thus, it is possible to evaluate an EMP’s performance
against such algorithms by computing the number of features
present in the grid load [17]. We classify as features those
differences that are larger or equal to 50 W, which represent
a typical household electricity consumption of lights. We plot
the number of features with respect to HF and HP in Fig. 8.
As expected, a larger HF leads to a reduction in the number
of features in the grid load (see Fig. 8a); however, this does
not hold with increasing HP (see Fig. 8b), which does not
seem to have a big impact on the number of features.
Another way of assessing the performance of privacy-
preserving algorithms is by analyzing the power spectrum of
the resulting grid load. In fact, the higher-frequency com-
ponents of the grid load spectrum correspond typically to
more sensitive information about a user’s energy consumption
compared to the lower-frequency components [24]. Fig. 9
shows the grid load spectra corresponding to using different
values of HF and HP . Larger values of HF lead to better
suppression of higher-frequency components when α = 1
(see Fig. 9b), whereas for α = 0 even additional high-
frequency components are introduced (see Fig. 9a). When
α = 1, increasing HP also attenuates the higher-frequency
components (see Fig. 9c), but less markedly compared to
increasing HF . As the spectral analysis of the grid load
7(a) HP = HF = 1h. (b) HP = 12h, HF = 1h. (c) HP = 1h, HF = 12h.
Fig. 5: Comparison between various past and prediction horizons for α = 0.5, when energy selling is not allowed.
(a) Energy selling. (b) Energy selling. (c) No energy selling.
Fig. 6: Impact of the prediction horizon HF on leakage, cost and target load variance, HP = 2h.
(a) Energy selling. (b) Energy selling. (c) No energy selling.
Fig. 7: Impact of the past horizon HP on leakage, cost and target load variance, HF = 2h.
captures better the information leaked, in the following section
we consider a privacy-preserving approach whose aim is to
filter out directly the higher-frequency components of the user
load.
IV. TARGET LOAD AS FILTERED USER LOAD
When the target load is set to a constant value, one can
consider this as the DC component of the Fourier transform
of the user load profile. If the grid load can be maintained
at the average value of the user load at all times, this is
equivalent to filtering out all the positive frequency compo-
nents of the user load profile. However, as shown in Section
III, this is not always possible due to the RB capacity and
power constraints, and the information leakage is measured
as average squared error distance from this constant DC
component. In this section, we consider a more general target
8(a) HP = 2h. (b) HF = 2h.
Fig. 8: Number of features vs HF and HP , no energy selling.
(a) α = 0, HP = 2h. (b) α = 1, HP = 2h. (c) α = 1, HF = 2h.
Fig. 9: Power spectra vs HF and HP , and no energy selling.
(a) SHM. (b) LHM.
Fig. 10: Filtered target load scenario with cut-off frequency of
0.1mHz, α = 1, and HF = HP = 2h.
(a) Constant target. (b) Filtered target.
Fig. 11: Practical EMP for α = 0.5, HF = HP = 2h, TS =
1h, and cut-off frequency set to 0.1mHz.
load profile, obtained by low-pass filtering the user load, which
is equivalent to removing only the high-frequency variations.
The motivation for this is two-fold: Firstly, the EMU is able
to better approximate the target load profile by keeping the
low-frequency components; and secondly, the high-frequency
components are the ones that leak more information about
user behavior. Low-frequency devices are those that typically
have continuous periodic operation, e.g., the fridge, and are
not particularly privacy sensitive. We would like to remark
that, differently from the previous section, here W is not an
optimization variable but it is determined based only on the
user load, and prior to solving the optimization problem. The
optimization problem is expressed as
min
G
t+HF
t
α
t+HF∑
τ=t
(Gτ −Wτ )
2 + (1− α)
t+HF∑
τ=t
GτCτ , (22)
whereWt,Wt+1, . . . ,Wt+HF are obtained as low-pass filtered
versions of the user load, subject to the same constraints of
the constant target scenario, i.e., (1)-(2) and (4)-(5). More
specifically, the target load at time t, Wt, is computed as
follows. The EMU considers only the user load within the time
window [t−HP , t+HF ], which, by hypothesis, is assumed
to be known. It computes the spectral representation of the
user load in this time window by means of discrete Fourier
transform, which is then low-pass filtered according to a
predefined cut-off frequency. Finally, the inverse transform
provides the target load profileWt. We note that, althoughHP
does not appear explicitly in (22), the target load computed at
time t is determined by low-pass filtering the user load within
the time window [t−HP , t+HF ] to prevent the target load
from varying dramatically over different TSs. When α = 0,
(22) reduces to a linear programming problem. The optimal
solutions to (22) can be characterized by following the same
steps of Section III, apart from Wt, which here is not an
optimization variable. The optimal solutions are given in (17)
and (19) for the scenarios where selling energy is allowed
and not allowed, respectively. Fig. 10 compares the the SHM
and LHM, showing that the SHM generates profiles that are
smooth and similar to that of the LHM, despite relying only
the knowledge of 2h of future consumption.
V. A MORE PRACTICAL EMP
In the previous sections it is assumed that the EMU solves
the optimization problem at each TS. However, in practice it
may not be feasible to obtain the future predictions at each
TS, and may be impractical to compute the target profile so
often. Thus, in this section we consider a more practical EMP
where the optimization problem is solved once every TS TSs.
The optimization problems at time t are still given by (11)
and (22) for the constant and filtered target load scenarios,
respectively, such that the sequences [Gt+TSt ] and [W
t+TS
t ] are
obtained at time t on the basis of the available information for
TSs [t−HP , t+HF ], where HF ≥ TS .
Fig. 11 shows the practical EMP for a constant and a filtered
target load. The practical EMP creates a piecewise target
and grid load, resembling the piecewise target load profile
approach studied in [18]. Due to the discontinuities induced
in the grid load profile, spikes at high frequencies may appear
in the spectrum of the grid load produced by this strategy,
leading to a higher privacy loss. When α = 1 Fig. 12 shows
that the practical EMP reaches virtually the same performance
9(a) LHM. (b) SHM. (c) Practical EMP.
Fig. 12: Filtered target load scenario with cut-off frequency of 0.1mHz, α = 1, and no energy selling. For the SHM and the
practical EMP we set HP = 2h and TS = 1h.
Fig. 13: The privacy-cost trade-off, for HP = HF = 2h,
TS = 1h, energy selling allowed, and constant target load.
of the SHL, despite computing the grid load six times less
often than the LHM.
Finally, in Fig. 13 we present the privacy-cost trade-offs for
the various scenarios when energy selling is allowed, which
highlights the loss in performance due to the limited amount
of information available to the EMU.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the joint optimization of privacy and cost
for an SM system equipped with an RB. Privacy is measured
via the mean squared-error between the SM measurements
and a target load profile, which is set to be either a constant
function or a low-pass filtered version of the user load. We
assume that only partial information about the user’s future
electricity consumption and electricity cost is known to the
EMU, and we cast the joint privacy and cost optimization as
a model predictive control problem. The scenario in which
the user is allowed to sell excess energy to the UP is also
studied, which is shown to achieve a better privacy-cost trade-
off. The optimal solutions for the constant and filtered target
load profiles have been characterized, highlighting their water-
filling interpretation. Detailed numerical simulations have been
presented, alternative privacy measures have been discussed,
and the privacy-cost trade-off for the various scenarios has
been characterized.
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